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y aim is to identify three stages of the encounter with 
modernity as they unfolded in the Arab World over 
the last two centuries, with the hope of understanding the 
driving forces that helped define and redefine Arab concep-
tions of the modern. The narrative begins with the intensi-
fying interaction with Europe in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, which spurred the start of the cosmopolitan phase—a 
period illustrated primarily by the Levantine culture of 
the coastal cities of Egypt and the Levant. Conceptions of 
modernity then largely transitioned to a nationalist phase 
with its powerful dream of a supranational identity. This 
Pan-Arabism spread across the Arab World from Morocco to 
Bahrain, setting the stage for the present day’s phase: a reli-
giously-imbued and at the same time a neoliberal capitalism 
best represented by the rich oil countries of the Arabian Gulf. 
The sequence is not a neat one; the stages overlap and bleed 
into each other to create a particularly complex form of Arab 
modernity unevenly distributed across regional, religious, 
ethnic, and class fault-lines. The result is there for everyone 
to see in a contemporary Arab World mired in several civil 




Modern European influence came by sea and seeped slowly 
into the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. First were the 
commercial outposts established in many eastern cities by 
European states. This began with Venice, Genoa, and Aragon 
in the late Middle Ages, and continued with France, Holland, 
and Britain from the sixteenth century onwards. While the 
resident merchants’ interaction with local communities was 
strictly limited during this period, they nonetheless intro-
duced novel European products to local markets—a pro-
cess that accelerated considerably in the nineteenth century. 
After this came the religious missions of the late eighteenth 
century, and the small schools started in predominantly 
Christian towns in Palestine and Mount Lebanon. The first 
Jesuit schools were established in 1770, but these missions 
grew in number and influence in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. They educated a new generation of mostly 
Christian boys and published Arabic translations of the Old 
and New Testaments before branching out to more general 
interest publications.
The military invasion of Egypt led by Napoleon Bona-
parte in 1798, and deceptively called the French Expedition, 
soon followed as the first modern colonial foray into the 
Arab World. Although it lasted for only three years, it was 
later exaggeratedly cast as the catalyst for the awakening 
of the Arab “Orient” to the achievements of European 
[ 5 ]
modernity. This awakening was painfully demonstrated 
in Egypt through the military superiority of French troops, 
which easily defeated the Ottomans and the Mamluks in 
several encounters. It was also perceived in the divergent 
French administrative organization and legal structures, as 
well as certain scientific innovations that the French savants 
occasionally demonstrated to a group of awestruck Egyptian 
ulama. One of these ulama, Hassan al-‘Attar, went on to write 
about his admiration of the French scientific experiments he 
witnessed and his strong belief in the need to modernize the 
curriculum of al-Azhar, the premier traditional educational 
institution in Egypt, which direly needed reform and which 
al-‘Attar would lead as the Grand Imam from 1830 to 1835.
But the idea of modernizing à la franca was not seriously 
pursued until the 1820s when Mohammad ‘Ali Pasha, the 
semi-independent and ambitious Viceroy of Egypt (1805–
1848), and the reformist Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (1789–
1839) almost concurrently concluded that, if they wanted 
to have a place in the new world order, they would have to 
adopt the latest European military systems, technological 
inventions, and managerial and economic methods. To that 
end, they imported scores of European experts to both Cairo 
and Istanbul in order to help modernize the army, adminis-
tration, and economy, and to later introduce new norms of 
city planning, hygiene and public health, and industry and 
commerce. 
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Modernization e≠orts, however, turned out to be a 
mixed blessing. While new, disciplined armies were formed, 
they were defeated in every major confrontation with the 
European powers that ultimately came to colonize both 
Egypt and the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. 
Education also received a boost: specialized schools were 
established in the two capitals, and secular curricula and 
professional training were introduced where none existed 
before. Slowly, an educated middle class emerged, whose 
members sta≠ed the bureaucracies needed to run the mod-
ernizing state. They acquired new tastes and lifestyle habits 
similar to their European counterparts, even though some 
conservative customs, such as gender segregation and the 
status of women generally, proved to be resistant to change. 
The economies of both states were also transformed with 
their incorporation into the global trade system. European 
corporations, which controlled most means of industrial 
production and distribution in the region, won concessions 
in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt to modernize infrastruc-
ture and open up markets. 
As part of this development e≠ort, however, modernizing 
rulers also had to yield to mounting pressure from the same 
European imperial powers with which they were eager to 
catch up and accept the imposition of legislation that under-
mined state authority on their own soil. Aptly named the 
“Capitulations”, these laws granted extraordinary financial 
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and legal advantages to foreigners living in their realms and 
to native minoritarian subjects (mainly Christian Syrians 
of all denominations, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews) who 
could claim the protection of a European imperial power. 
Consequently, a new, ethnically-mixed social group formed 
that benefitted from the preferential treatment provided by 
local authorities, and came to dominate the developing one-
way trade with industrialized, capitalist Europe—a group 
that fast began displacing the indigenous mercantile class 
that had controlled the traditional local economy. 
Within a few decades, the cities where this rising new 
bourgeoisie was concentrated, Smyrna (Izmir), Salonica 
(Thessaloniki), Istanbul, Alexandria, Cairo, and later Beirut, 
turned into vibrant cosmopolitan centers of trade, complete 
with ports, wide avenues, department stores, banks, o∞ce 
buildings, and all the trappings of modern urban living. 
These fast developing cities presented not only a new façade 
of the “Orient,” but also a foothold for Western interests 
where the two cultures, with their diverse religions, ethnic-
ities, and languages, could meet, interact, and cohabitate in 
ways that would have been unthinkable in the more ethni-
cally homogenous inland cities. 
A new type of individual with the very expressive name 
“Levantine” emerged in this freewheeling environment. The 
name came from the French term Levant: the place where 
the sun rises, which, from Europe’s vantage point, is the 
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Eastern Mediterranean. The name itself thus imaginatively 
blends Eastern locale with a European cultural referent to 
designate the dual ethnic background of its bearer. The 
emerging Levantine culture embodied this mixed, hybrid 
identity. It was “Oriental” in its beliefs, customs, forms, and 
provenance and European in its mores, sensibilities, styles, 
and ambitions. City-based and urbane, it was multinational, 
or perhaps even supranational, as it belonged neither to 
the place of its dwelling nor to that of its cultural aspira-
tion. It stood for the possibility of bringing together people 
of diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds to live, trade, 
make money, and be merry together. Gaston Zananiri, a con-
summate Levantine with a Syrian-Ottoman father and an 
Italian-Hungarian-Jewish mother, who lived in Alexandria, 
described this culture as “brilliant, rich and superficial, open 
to the Mediterranean while closed to Egypt (and presumably 
the rest of the Arab interior).”
In fact, contrary to Zananiri’s hypothesis, Levantine 
culture played a major role in defining the era across the 
Arab interior, especially in Egypt and the Levant. This is 
partly because the coastal enclaves of Izmir, Smyrna, and 
to a lesser extent Istanbul and Thessaloniki, lost much of 
their Levantine character and Levantine inhabitants after 
the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establish-
ment of staunch nationalist governments in Kemalist Turkey 
and in Greece. In Egypt, however, Levantine culture was 
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actually energized with the imposition of European colo-
nialism at the end of the nineteenth century. A similar e≠ect 
took place in the interior Levant at the end of the First World 
War. In both areas, colonial authorities saw the Levantines 
as indispensable commercial middlemen and interpreters 
of local mores, as well as exotic reminders of the cultivated 
refinement they left behind in their colonial metropolises, 
although they never granted the Levantines the coveted title 
of “European” or treated them as equals. 
The Levantine culture, or at least its outer appearances, 
did not remain particular to the Levantines themselves. It 
spread among the native upper class throughout the Arab 
World, who found in the Levantine form a suitable arrange-
ment that integrated their acquired European outlook and 
tastes with their conservative and traditional milieu. In the 
Arab World, a Levantine hybrid culture thus became the 
prevailing expression of the Westernized “Orientals,” both 
native and Levantine, who nonetheless remained socially 
separated by class, religion, and sense of belonging. They 
could do business with each other, attend the same foreign 
or missionary schools, use French as their main conversa-
tional language, read the same books and newspapers, meet 
in cafés, clubs, and horse racetracks, frequent the theater and 
art exhibitions together, shop at the same grands magasins. 
At the same time, they rarely intermarried or built intimate 
relationships across social fault-lines, and of course they did 
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not share the same political views or ties to the European 
authorities. 
Thus, during its heyday in the Arab Mashreq (the coun-
tries of the Arab World east of Libya) between 1880 and 
1950, the Levantine culture found its expression primarily 
in an exuberant and cosmopolitan lifestyle, which was lived 
in beautiful homes, trendy cafés, restaurants, and caba-
rets; supported by businesses housed in large o∞ce build-
ings; and supplied by fashionable department stores that 
rivaled those of Paris, the distant trendsetter and archetype. 
Levantine architecture was cast in a charming eclectic mix of 
styles that ranged from Neo-Moorish and Neo-Baroque to 
Art Nouveau and Art Deco and every style in between. Many 
relics of that age—outdated, exhausted, and abused—still 
stand across the Mashreq in Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, 
and Iraq. They are the subject of continuing intellectual and 
emotional battles among the educated bourgeoisie over their 
significance and whether they should be preserved from 
realistic developers, who see them primarily as underutilized 
real-estate assets devoid of any true meaning or historical 
relevance to the masses. 
Levantine culture never aspired to or managed to pene-
trate the lower native classes. Take, for instance, the famous 
book by Lawrence Durrell, The Alexandria Quartet (pub-
lished between 1957 and 1960), whose first three volumes 
are set in cosmopolitan Alexandria at the onset of the Second 
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World War. Durrell’s inventive modernist narrative is replete 
with a≠ectionate descriptions of Alexandria seen through 
the eyes of its European and Levantine inhabitants, who 
otherwise evince ambivalent notions of belonging and pro-
nounced haughtiness towards the “Arabs,” their preferred 
term for the Egyptian natives. Those natives, of course, con-
stituted the vast majority of the city’s residents despite their 
minimal role in the lives of the Quartet’s protagonists, save 
as servants and background décor, a function they also occu-
pied in real life. 
Or consider the famous Alexandria: A History and a Guide 
(1922) that E.M. Forster wrote while stationed in Egypt 
during the First World War. The book is deemed among the 
best modernist literary presentations of a city, and consists 
of an exhaustively researched and idiosyncratically struc-
tured history followed by a series of visits executed mostly 
by tramway excursions to the city’s important sites. But 
what history and what sites? Forster spends much time and 
e≠ort recounting Ptolemaic and early Christian Alexandria 
between the third century bce and the sixth century ce, 
reimagining its monuments and contextualizing them by 
quoting at lengths from Classical authors and European 
literary figures. He then casually skips over more than ten 
centuries of Islamic history, which he calls “years of silence,” 
before resuming the narrative in the sixteenth century to 
culminate with colonial Alexandria and its cosmopolitan 
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present, literally mapped onto its presumed Hellenistic 
glorious past. In other words, Forster not only ignores the 
native inhabitants, he actually erases their past from the 
city’s history and expunges their still standing architectural 
heritage from its topography. In a nutshell, Forster denies 
the Egyptian Alexandrians any claim over their city, which 
he sees as the exclusive domain of its Western or Levantine 
citizens.
There were exceptions to this narrative, most nota-
bly Beirut, which was a city that came relatively late to its 
Levantine phase. It is a city whose bounty of cosmopoli-
tanism extended to all its inhabitants: natives, foreigners, 
Levantines, and Arab émigrés. Beirut benefited in particu-
lar from its inclusive, some would say lax, approach to the 
notion of belonging, as it built its mid-twentieth-century 
reputation as the “Paris of the East.” It became a hub of com-
merce, pleasure tourism, and espionage, and the prime ref-
uge for Arab captains of industry, as well as intellectual and 
political dissidents fleeing other Arab countries that were 
succumbing one by one to autocratic, ideologically rigid mil-
itary regimes. These developments made Beirut the unex-
pected center of Arab culture with its relatively free press, 
robust American University steeped in the liberal arts tradi-
tion, thriving theater, music, and art scene, and literary cafés 
where expatriate Arab intellectuals of all political colors met, 
debated, and dreamt of a better future. 
[ 13 ]
Beirut tragically lost that status during its brutal fifteen-
year civil war (1975–1990), which destroyed both its cosmo-
politan spirit and the favorite hangouts of its urban maze. 
Somewhat anachronistically, and despite the turmoil sur-
rounding it, Beirut has been recently trying to recreate that 
vanished image with all its nostalgic accouterments from 
cafés to art-galleries to cabarets, especially in the downtown 
Solidere reconstruction project. But the rebuilding, some-
times done from scratch and exquisitely attentive to authen-
tic architectural details, is marred by the leftover politics 
of the civil war and a contrived neoliberal funding scheme 
tinged by the tastes of the desert and the lure of black gold. 
It has yet to recover the allure of the cosmopolitanism of old 
Beirut.
Levantine cosmopolitanism understandably retreated 
with the end of colonialism, its main manipulator, bene-
factor, and protector. It was dealt a second blow with the 
violent splitting of Palestine and the creation of Israel as a 
Jewish state in 1948. The dispossessed Palestinians took ref-
uge in the surrounding Arab countries, while many of the 
Levantines, including Iraqi and Egyptian Jews, moved to 
Israel or Europe. They left behind abandoned businesses, 
empty palaces, deserted cafés, and a handful of stragglers 
that largely withdrew from public life to live with the 
reminders of their former glitzy days. In response to these 
changes, a few turned their sense of loss and nostalgia into 
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art. The Armenian-Egyptian photographer Van Leo (born 
Levon Boyadjian, 1921–2002), for example, celebrated the 
age that just passed in polished, poignantly black and white 
self-portraits fashioned after stylish Western models and in 
images of celebrities resonant of the carefree and chic life-
style of yesteryears. 
The most nostalgic Levantine artist was perhaps the late 
director Youssef Chahine (1926–2008), whose series of films 
on Alexandria, Alexandria, Why? (1978), Adieu Bonaparte 
(1985), and Alexandria Again and Again (1989), tell the story 
of his native city from the perspective of the unapologet-
ically Westernized cosmopolitan yet Egyptian-to-the-core 
gentleman that he was. In Alexandria, Why? and Alexandria 
Again and Again he weaves his thinly-veiled autobiographi-
cal narrative around the glamor, tolerance, and open-mind-
edness that marked the city of his youth in contrast to the 
narrow-minded, conservative, and ill-mannered way of life 
that he saw rising around him. He criticized that hardening 
of values directly in his later film, al-Masir (The Destiny, 
1997). That movie was set in Ibn Rushd’s Cordoba of the 
eleventh century but dealt with the authoritarianism, cen-
sorship, fundamentalism, and violence of the contemporary 




The end of colonialism bequeathed center stage to another 
form of modernity in the Arab World: nationalism. The lib-
eration movements and political parties that took over from 
the withdrawing colonial powers rushed in to shape their 
countries’ sovereign identity. New powerful concepts, such 
as historical identity, authenticity, and the recovery of Arab 
cultural roots, rose to the pinnacle of political and public 
interest. Concurrently, the center of gravity in urban life 
shifted from the cities of the seacoast, open to the West and 
its tempting influence, towards the grand cities of the inte-
rior, Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, the old capitals of Arab 
golden ages. Arabic supplanted the cacophony of languages 
spoken by the Levantines, and Arab history and culture 
became both the focus of the intelligentsia and the foun-
dations of the state’s cultural and educational policies. This 
focus on Arab identity would also receive a significant boost 
from the more radical ideals brandished by the regimes in 
Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, and later Libya and the 
Sudan, that came to power through military coups during 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
Lacking some of the crucial components of legitimate 
governments, the military regimes overcompensated with 
an exaggerated reliance on the politics of class and identity. 
While all of them pursued a statist agenda bedecked with 
[ 16 ]
the trappings of nationalism, most also simultaneously sub-
scribed to a mixture of supranationalism, a pan-Arabism 
combined with a hollowed form of state socialism. Modeled 
on badly translated French and German theoretical models, 
and equipped with its own historical and territorial claims 
and symbolic programs, political Arab nationalism peaked 
in the 1960s. It particular, it found its fulfillment in Egypt’s 
charismatic leader Gamal Abd al-Nasir who led a hastily con-
structed United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria that 
lasted from 1958 to 1961. In the beginning, the euphoria of 
unity dominated the public sphere; millions sang with Abdel 
Halim Hafez, al-‘andalib al-asmar (the “Black Nightingale”) 
of Egypt, watani habibi, al-watan al-akbar (my beloved 
country, the great country) in anticipation of the coming 
full Arab unity. Slowly many Syrians came to feel that their 
country had been shortchanged and they eventually backed 
another military coup that broke up the union with Egypt. 
Despite this debacle, however, Arab unity remained for 
a generation a dream of the masses and a political inter-
est pursued by the so-called progressive military regimes, 
especially among those who were looking to legitimize their 
authority. Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, a series of 
hastily-conceived unification attempts alternately involved 
Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, and Algeria. All 
of these were short-lived, and left behind only a plethora of 
modified flags that ri≠ed on the themes of the eagle and the 
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star against the backdrop of the alleged colors of Arabism, 
black, white, red, and green. 
These same regimes adopted ambitious socialist modern-
ization programs, complete with land reforms, socialization 
of basic services, and grand public projects that were meant 
to herald the new age of progress. The socialist framework 
was predicated on a modern working class that was defined 
and celebrated through grandiose, poorly conceived, and 
hastily implemented agricultural, industrial, educational, 
and infrastructural projects. This changed the face of Arab 
cities, which rapidly acquired large governmental complexes, 
whole new administrative and industrial districts, a variety 
of public housing, and universities and schools. This for-
mal architectural modernism, sometimes softened by sym-
bolic references to history or gestures toward climate and 
site, apparently rested on the assumption that modernist 
building projects could stand-in for expressions of cultural 
modernity.
Progressive modernization remained an incomplete proj-
ect in the face of inherited or created geographic, historical, 
and social contradictions. It further su≠ered from corrup-
tion, autocratic mismanagement, incompetence, and igno-
rant naïveté, compounded by the protracted yet irresolute 
conflict with Israel and the overwhelmingly interventionist 
Cold War politics that drowned the region in endless polit-
ical scheming. On top of this, the startling defeat of Egypt, 
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Syria, and Jordan in the 1967 war with Israel spelled the 
end of the grand plan of building modern states that would 
lead to a unified and triumphant Arab nation. A mood of 
defeated melancholy and wounded ego pervaded the culture 
and the arts everywhere in the Arab World. There were some 
who tried to respond to this defeat with measured calls for 
ideological and intellectual revisions to how the Arab World 
should approach modernity. They included thinkers such 
as Sadik Jalal al-Azm, author of Al-Nakd al-Dhati Ba’da 
al-Hazima (Self-Criticism After the Defeat) (1968) and Naqd 
al-Fikr al-Dini (Critique of Religious Thought) (1969). It 
also included artists such as Youssef Chahine, who blamed 
endemic corruption for defeat in his iconic film The Sparrow 
(1972), and Saadallah Wannous, whose play Haflat Samar 
min Ajl Khamsa Huzayran (Evening Party for the Fifth of June) 
strongly indicted the entire Arab political system. These 
intellectuals, however, were all strongly rebuked, and some-
times prosecuted, by regimes that adamantly refused to 
acknowledge their role in the Great Defeat and that held on 
to the belief that the territories would someday be recovered 
after the (rhetorically downgraded) al-Naksa (the Setback). 
The hope of Arab nationalism was soon rekindled by 
a newly-invigorated Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(plo). The plo provided an opportunity for the Arab world 
to commit to not only a revolutionary liberation movement, 
but also an entire project of building Palestinian national 
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culture complete with art, literature, and the scholarship of 
remembrance. Yet these hopes were repeatedly dashed: first 
by the Black September War between Jordan and the plo 
in 1970, then by the excruciating Lebanese Civil War in 1975, 
and finally the October War of 1973 between the Arabs and 
Israelis. This final encounter resulted in the Camp David 
Accords of 1978 between the Egyptians and Israelis, which 
broke any remaining semblance of Arab cohesion. The death 
of Abdel-Nasser in September 1970, possibly out of exhaus-
tion at trying to broker a deal between the plo and King 
Hussein of Jordan, darkly presaged the closing of a chapter 
in modern Arab history. 
 The 1970s and 1980s saw an economic-political reversal 
in most Arab republics with the dismantling of the falter-
ing socialist experiments of the 1950s and 1960s and their 
gradual replacement with a statist form of crony capital-
ism. In Egypt, this process was initiated by Anwar al-Sadat, 
Abdel-Nasser’s successor in Egypt, and given the mislead-
ingly liberal name Infitah (opening up). The net e≠ect of 
this project was deepening economic inequality in the coun-
try with little political gain. Similar, though more carefully 
disguised, economic reorientations followed in ostensibly 
Arab socialist or quasi-socialist countries, such as Syria, Iraq, 
Yemen, Libya, and Algeria. In these countries, the military 
regimes hardened into tyrannical dictatorships devoid of 
any political pretensions, whose sole purpose was to stay in 
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power and to enrich their narrow bases of supporters. Most 
of these countries experienced acute problems of urban and 
rural degradation, infrastructural exhaustion, demographic 
explosion, and socioeconomic inequality. In the 1980s and 
1990s, despondent rural migration flooded the cities. The 
cities swelled uncontrollably, and at an unprecedented rate, 
to house the bursting poor population in peripheral, min-
imally zoned, and badly serviced areas that were strangu-
lating the old urban cores. These dismal living conditions, 
su≠ered by the vast majority of Arab urban dwellers, were at 
the root of various violent riots over the years, and eventually 
culminated in the revolts of the Arab Spring, which unfor-
tunately devolved into the exceedingly destructive armed 
conflicts a±icting most of the countries that revolted against 
their dictators in 2011.
political islam and capital
The revolts of the Arab World did not erupt until the begin-
ning of the second decade of the twenty-first century and, 
as a result, the Arab masses had to endure their ageing and 
hardening dictatorships even after the end of the twentieth 
century. During this period, Arab nationalism waned as the 
premier rallying call for the region and a di≠erent and pas-
sionate political discourse that saw “Islam” as a more truthful 
framer of identity rose in its place. Of course, the politicization 
of religion was not new. It had been operative since at least 
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March 1928 when, in Isma‘iliyya, Egypt, Hassan al-Banna 
founded the Muslim Brotherhood, by some accounts, the 
intellectual and organizational fountainhead from which 
most later Islamic political parties evolved. These more 
recent movements, however, developed in radically diver-
gent contexts that molded both their outlook and their modi 
operandi. In the left-leaning military regimes, where Pan-
Arabism was the dominant political ideology, political Islam 
existed as an underground current that emerged on the sur-
face in the 1980s. On the other hand, in Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf Sheikhdoms, where national image was already based 
on Islamic identity, a tamed and heavily controlled form 
of political Islam thrived as state dogma. It was, however, 
only after two momentous events in 1979—the triumph of 
the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan—that political Islam galvanized as a response 
to the failure of Pan-Arabism to address the contemporary 
challenges of Israeli aggression, foreign interference, eco-
nomic corruption, and moral decadence. 
Political Islam has sometimes taken a violent turn. Part 
of this violent response is inspired by radical Islamist think-
ers like Sayyid Qutb. In his manifesto, Ma‘alim fi-l Tariq 
(Milestones) (1964), Qutb advocates for jihad against jahili-
yya (pre-Islamic ignorance or secular authorities, whether 
Islamic or Western) as the most reliable means of recovering 
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the true Islamic polity that recognizes only God’s sovereignty 
(hakimiyya). Contemporary militant, and at times exceed-
ingly violent, Islamist organizations have taken up this fight 
against what they perceive as secular and Western-controlled 
Arab regimes. Some use stealthy methods, such as assassi-
nation and suicide bombing, to spread terror. Others wage 
military campaigns against regular Arab armies or foreign 
forces. Their political programs are often rather ambiguous 
but their ultimate goal is to re-establish what they perceive 
as a more authentic Islamic form of governance, drawn 
from a strict and literalist reading of scriptures, to rule over 
al-Umma (the Islamic nation). The Islamic State, currently 
expanding in Iraq and Syria despite the countero≠ensive of 
an international coalition, is but the most successful mani-
festation of that movement to date.
This badly understood movement of political Islam is 
still evolving. Its byproducts have been spreading since the 
early 1980s under the watchful eye of the brutal, yet per-
haps complacent, regimes in the form of vestmental and 
behavioral modifications, such as veiling among women 
and growing beards among men; louder and more defiant 
presence of religious practices and symbols in the public 
space; and more vocal, and sometimes very violent, objec-
tions to all cultural and social practices perceived as “secular” 
or as modern Western imports. Despite its apparent ascen-
dancy, political Islam has had surprisingly little influence 
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on creative culture, which remains largely nationalist and 
Western-influenced. Aside from crude proselytization 
through populist web portals, publications, and television 
stations with their tele-Islamists, political Islam has not 
penetrated the arts, literature, or media in general in any 
significant way, save for the few and far between “awaken-
ings” of actors or singers and their subsequent retirement or 
conversion to religiously-sanctioned practices. Cat Stevens, 
a.k.a. Yusuf Islam, is a famous international example who 
restricted his singing after his conversion to religious hymns 
with no musical accompaniment. Admittedly, he seems to 
be coming back nowadays. Another, more militant exam-
ple is Fadl Shaker who was a popular Lebanese singer until 
his withdrawal from public life in 2012, when he joined the 
extremist Salafi leader Ahmad al-Asir in his botched con-
frontation with the Lebanese army in Sidon.
By contrast, another group that has wielded a similar, but 
less radical, view of Islam as a frame for identity is the elite 
of the exceedingly rich states of the Gulf region. Decidedly 
comfortable with the nation-state framework and its mod-
ern structures, this leading political and economic group 
has had a tremendous impact on decisive cultural, social, 
financial, and urban changes in the Arab World in recent 
years. Having laid on the edge of the desert, away from the 
centers of Arabic culture, and, with the exception of Saudi 
Arabia and Oman, having not achieved independence until 
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the 1960s and even 1970s, the people of the Gulf had no 
role in the early development of modern Arab culture. This 
situation began to change shortly after the discovery of oil 
in the 1940s and, more dramatically, after the 1974 oil price 
surge when these poor countries became super-rich. The 
empowerment occasioned by the huge financial surplus 
accumulated from oil, the deeply religious and conservative 
outlook of the Gulf elite, and the fervent desire for politi-
cal and cultural prominence in the region, created a great 
demand for a contemporary and dynamic yet recognizable 
Islamic identity, which found its most visible expressions in 
lifestyle and urban forms. 
Developments on the regional and world stage at the end 
of the twentieth century intensified the already potent blend 
of conservatism and capital in the makeup of the Arabian 
Gulf states. First was the foolish and ill-fated invasion of 
Kuwait by Saddam Hussein in 1990, which only further 
deteriorated the trust between Arab countries. The attempt 
by the United States-led international coalition to repel 
Saddam eventually resulted in the devastation of Iraq, the 
strongest Arab nationalist state leftover from an earlier age, 
and the strengthened United States hegemony over the secu-
rity and economies of the Gulf countries. Internationally, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the dissolution of 
its socialist model further emboldened an already rampant 
capitalism to extend its reach all over the globe. The Arabian 
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Gulf, awash in cash, relatively underexploited, and eager to 
diversify and secure its sources of income presented the 
perfect combination of willing lucrative market and loaded 
potential partner to global capitalism. 
Dubai, with its entrepreneurial spirit, unrestrained lais-
sez-faire economy, and aggressive pursuit of investments, 
led the way. The entire city, from desert to coast, became 
the world’s most phenomenal real-estate development with 
gargantuan business parks and malls, luxury residences 
and hotels, and showy entertainment complexes. In this 
make-believe setting, the “utopian capitalist city,” as writer 
Mike Davis called it, emerged as a branding instrument and 
spectacular wrapping for new lavish enterprises, which 
broke all previous norms of size, form, function, fantasy, 
and, often, economic purpose and urban vision. Yet, the 
fierce pursuit of extravagant projects aimed at the global 
wealthy spread uncontrollably to other Arabian Gulf cities. 
Eventually, they all acquired super-slick high-rises tower-
ing over their skylines; lavish shopping malls with trendy 
boutiques; investment banks, stock markets, and venture 
capitalists looking for investment opportunities; outposts 
of “American” universities seeking to benefit from the supe-
rior reputation of their namesakes; cultural monuments 
that they hope will put them on the world travel map; sat-
ellite channels and print and online publications that have 
regional and even global aspirations; and enormous state 
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mosques exclaiming their Islamic and deeply conservative 
identity. 
Although the implementation of huge developments in 
the Arabian cities during the last twenty years has brought an 
influx of people of myriad nationalities, ethnicities, and reli-
gions that vastly surpassed the population of native inhab-
itants, no real cosmopolitan urban society has materialized. 
Instead, separate communities live side by side in their dis-
tinct districts with little interaction and cross-fertilization, 
and with a clear hierarchy that converts the pre-modern 
tribal order into a contemporary polity. The ruling families 
monopolize all political power, granting the native citizenry 
extraordinary economic and civil services while denying 
expatriate communities rights to much of their city. The 
professional expatriates, who come mostly from the West 
and some Arab countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and 
Palestine, enjoy considerable financial advantages and some 
minor civic rights, but they have no legal way to achieve true 
citizenship. The masses of poor laborers—the South and 
Southeast Asians who constitute the majority of the Arabian 
cities’ residents—are deprived of even the most basic civil 
rights. They are discriminated against, poorly paid, o≠ered 
no social security or access to due process, and crowded in 
ill-kempt camps or dilapidated rental neighborhoods away 
from the city. Despite recent signs of change in some of these 
states, yielding to pressure from international human rights 
[ 27 ]
organizations, the grave problems that this situation has cre-
ated have yet to be properly addressed and resolved.
The harsh e≠ects of the extreme conditions of real estate 
capitalism, however, are felt more acutely in the older and 
poorer Arab cities that cannot sustain this kind of financial 
and urban extravaganza. Many were nonetheless invaded 
by Dubai-style developments that accelerated physical decay 
by cutting through their urban fabric, siphoned funds away 
from their public services, and deepened the discrepancy 
between their haves and have-nots. But the most alarming 
consequence of this relentless manipulation of capital is the 
fading of the civic qualities that were slowly acquired over 
the last two centuries, and their replacement by a double- 
headed market-driven commodification process, which has 
split the city into two extremes. On one end, the old, poor 
quarters are robbed of the last vestiges of urban life and 
turned into run-down contiguous village-like neighbor-
hoods cut o≠ from the authorities and the law and left to live 
by their own informal and traditional codes. On the other 
end, the new rich suburbs acquire a consumerist and glo-
balized identity that has no local feel or sense of belonging. 
When the 2011 revolts of the Arab Spring erupted, they 
were partially a response to these conditions. The activists 
who initiated the protests aimed at nothing less than to 
redress the perversion that had for more than half a century 
impressed upon their people the obligation to sacrifice their 
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civil rights for their repeatedly hijacked national integrity. 
They were in fact seeking to restore to their countries the 
principle of citizenship as the basis of belonging and the 
ideal of equality under the rule of law, both of which are of 
course modern concepts. But things did not go as hoped for 
and the promising Arab Spring degenerated into a patch-
work of gloomy prospects. Why did this happen? 
The most obvious answer is that the long-lived dicta-
torial regimes have so severely damaged the fiber of their 
societies that it will take a long time to fully restore civic 
virtues, assuming that the new rising forces have the will and 
the desire to repair to a civic political system. But, as I have 
tried to show, the roots of the problem go farther back. They 
are to be found in the particularly complex history of the 
uneven engagement with various aspects of modernity in 
the last two centuries. This incomplete process has fostered 
acute discrepancies in identity, ideology, and wealth among 
the mosaic of sects, ethnicities, tribes, and civic groups that 
share the same space and relentlessly compete over the right 
to define it. Their fighting has now come to the open in a 
very vicious and devastating manner. At this moment, the 
buoyant beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 appears like a 
blip in a long and very hot summer. 
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